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Abstract.  This  paper  discusses  the  redistributive  impact  of  the  Dutch  social 
security system on lifetime basis. Net benefits appear to be positive for the birth 
generations up to  1960.  Social insurances  show a  declining net benefit,  whereas 
for occupational pensions the reverse holds. It is generally assumed that flat-rated 
social security schemes are more redistributive  ones than wage-related schemes. 
However,  the  Dutch  social  security  system shows  that  on  a  lifetime basis  the 
redistributive impact of flat-rated general insurances does not necessarily largely 
differ from the wage-related employee insurances. Social assistance schemes result 
in a very large income redistribution in view of the small amounts involved. Social 
insurances and social assistance schemes have an income equalizing effect. On the 
contrary,  occupational pensions increase income inequality. 
1.  Introduction 
Research into the field of the redistributive impact of social security schemes on 
lifetime income  is  very scarce.  In their  survey article  on  the  effect  of income 
transfer programmes on  -  among other things  -  the income distribution,  Dan- 
ziger et al.  (1981:  1014)  state "...no  studies measure the redistributive effect of 
all transfers using a  lifetime or even a  multiyear accounting period". This situa- 
tion did not change in the 1980s. This does not however mean that studies on the 
lifetime redistributive impact of social security schemes are not available at all. 
An overview can be found in Nelissen (1994,  Chap.  2).  But,  all these studies are 
limited to only one aspect of social security, viz. pensions provisions. Especially 
the redistributive impact of the Old Age Insurance (OAI) in the United States has 
been the subject of discussion. Nelissen (1994) is the first study that measures the 
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redistributive impact of the social security system on a lifetime basis in a realistic 
way.  It  is  carried  out  by  means  of  microsimulation  and  applied  to  the 
Netherlands. Other approximations of lifetime social security incidence are from 
Davies et al. (1984) and Harding (1993) and Falkingham et al. (1993).  Davies et 
al.  only use an average net benefit for all schemes together, only discriminating 
by age, but not in the course of time, whereas Harding and Falkingham et al. start 
from a hypothetical cohort, keeping constant all parameters at the 1986-level and 
1985-level, respectively. 
The current definition of social security in its broad sense in the Netherlands 
considers  social  security as  the  totality of legal measures  which  are  aimed  at 
guaranteeing continuity in the spending opportunities. On the basis of this defini- 
tion, one can divide social security into four components: (1) social insurances; 
(2)  occupational pensions;  (3)  social assistance and  (4)  direct payments by the 
employer. Social insurances are all legal arrangements which are primarily aimed 
at income redistribution  between persons or social groups whereby the right to 
a benefit is based on the insurance concept. Voluntary insurances, for which par- 
ticipation depends  on  legalized entry requirements,  are  also  considered social 
insurances.  In  the  Netherlands,  the  social  insurances  are  characterised  by  a 
dualistic system,  namely a  combination of a  flat-rated (but not means-tested) 
minimum system covering the whole population (called general  insurances)  and 
a wage-related system for employees (called employee insurances).  In both cases 
contributions depend on the income and have to be paid up to a ceiling.  The first 
one starts from the solidarity principle, whereas the latter has the equivalence or 
insurance principle as its starting-point. Both are financed by the pay-as-you-go 
system. These two types of social insurances cover about 40 and 30%0, respective- 
ly, of the total social security expenditures in the Netherlands. The general in- 
surances  include  the  old-age  state  pension  (AOW),  the  widow  state  pension 
(AWW),  the disability state pension (AAW), the family allowances (AKW) and 
the state provision for health costs (AWBZ). The net pensions for a family, a one- 
parent family and a  single person amount to  100, 90 and 70°70, respectively, of 
the net minimum wage (about Dfl. 23070 or $12800 in 1994). The employee in- 
surances are the sickness benefit (ZW), the disability benefit (WAO), the unem- 
ployment benefit (WW) and (up to a certain income limit) the health care costs 
provision for employees (ZFW).  Here, the gross benefit for the ZW, WAO and 
WW amounts to 70% of the last earned income, up to a maximum of Dfl. 74360 
for $ 41300 in 1994. 
Occupational pensions include all arrangements, which primarily are aimed 
at the redistribution  of the income of persons over time.  They are based on a 
labour relation. These pension insurances are financed by a capital reserve system. 
So, a relationship is created between the insured person and the pension fund. The 
insured person has a personal claim to the pension fund, so to speak. In contrast, 
the old-age state pension (AOW)  has not been based on a labour relations and 
is financed by the pay-as-you-go system. Contributions for the occupational pen- 
sions generally depend on the income. The benefits are mostly related to the last 
earned wage income and are supplementary to the old-age state pension. The oc- 
cupational pensions cover about 12% of total social security expenditures. Social 
assistance schemes include all arrangements in the field of social security, where 
the  (means-tested)  benefits  are  financed  directly  by  the  state.  No  specific 
premiums are levied: these provisions are financed by public funds. The General 
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Its maximum benefits equal those for the general insurances. The social assistance 
schemes also cover about  12%  of total social security expenditures. Direct pay- 
ments by the employer refer to payments to (former) employees on the basis  of 
a  labour  relation.  It mainly concern benefits towards (former) public servants. 
The benefits are wage-related, with the exception of the child allowances. No con- 
tributions have been levied. The benefits are also  financed via public funding. 
They form about 5%  of the social security expenditures. 
In this article we will compare the amounts involved on a lifetime basis  and 
the lifetime redistributive impact of these types of social security schemes. We 
first give some information on the used microsimulation model. Then we go into 
the results (Sect. 3), whereas Sect. 4 concludes. In this, we will limit ourselves to 
the vertical income redistribution. 
2.  The  microsimulation model NEDYMAS 
The applied model, called NEDYMAS  -  which stands for NEtherlands DYnamic 
Micro-Analytic Simulation model (see Nelissen 1991, 1993, 1994)  -  is a dynamic 
cross-sectional model. Dynamic microsimulation comes initially from the ideas of 
Orcutt  (see Orcutt et al.  1976,  1986).  An  overview of the  ins  and  outs  of the 
microsimulation approach, especially with respect to social policy, can be found 
in Citro and Hanushek (t991). The dynamic approach implies that demographic 
processes are explicitly simulated, which means that the size of the microdata base 
changes during the simulation period. The sample passes through time year by 
year. For each person in the micro database one examines which personal charac- 
teristics change, and to what extent, each year. The principle of microsimulation 
is  simple.  To illustrate this,  !  will use the modelling of mortality. The decision 
whether an individual will or will not undergo a potential transition, is simulated 
with the aid of the Monte Carlo method.  In view of this, the conditional pro- 
bability of an individual undergoing that event has to be given. For example, for 
a  77-year-old divorced woman the probability of dying was 6.75%  in  1968.  We 
then randomly draw a number from the uniform [0,  1] distribution. If this num- 
ber is smaller than or equal to 0.0675  (the probability of dying), the woman is 
expected to die. If the number is larger than 0.0675, the woman will remain alive. 
If she dies, we then check to see if she had dependent children (who have become 
orphans). So, decisions (or events) at the level of an individual can have implica- 
tions for other individuals.  Microsimulation creates a  synthetic database which 
reflects the (developments in the) demographic and  economic structure of the 
population. A  stylised example is given in Fig. 1. 
At the heart of microsimulation modelling is its state representation of the 
components of the system of interest. To execute this representation,  first draw 
a list of attributes  for each individual in the sample. Next, after the adaptation 
of a  micro-representation,  specify  an  initial  population.  It  would  have  been 
preferable to use a real sample of individuals and households along with their at- 
tributes.  However, such a  sample is not available. A  first useable sample can be 
derived  from the  1947  Census  data;  see Nelissen  (1991,  1994).  So,  the model 
simulates  all events from 1947.  Each year the characteristics of the individuals 
(and thus the households) are updated, if necessary. The modules which are used 
in the current version of NEDYMAS and the sequence of treatment are given in 
Table 1. Like all microsimulation models, NEDYMAS is a recursive model. First, 92 
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1986 (sample data)  1987 (aged data) 
ID  Age  Sex  Job  Income  ID  Age  Sex  Job  Income 
Household  1  Household  1 
P 1  1  47  M  Yes  38 000  P 1  1  48  M  Yes  38 000 
P2  2  44  F  No  0  P2  2  45  F  No  0 
P3  3  20  M  Yes  23 000  P3  4  16  M  No  0 
P4  4  15  M  No  0 
Household 2 
P 1  5  79  F  No  14 000 
Household 3 
P1  6  37  M  Yes  32000 
P2  7  38  F  No  0 
P3  8  18  F  No  0 
Household 4 
Household 2 
P1  3 
P2  8 
Household 3 
P1  6 
P2  7 
Household 4 
21  M  Yes  25 000 
19  F  No  0 
38  M  Yes  35200 
39  F  Yes  14175 
a Pi =  i th person in the household;  ID =  identification number 
Source: Hellwig (1988) 
all demographic transitions are made in the model. Next education is considered, 
and  thereafter changes  in  economic activity, with the resulting labour income. 
Lastly, the income transfers and taxes are modelled. With the exception of the oc- 
cupational pensions  -  which have been considered as social security income  - 
the simulation model is not able to simulate capital income, because it does not 
contain a module for private consumption. So, savings cannot be determined and 
as  a  consequence  neither  can  wealth  or  income  from  wealth.  Therefore,  the 
analysis is limited to the redistributive impact of the social security system with 
respect to lifetime labour income. Because the model does not contain a module 
for capital income, taxes are imposed only on wages and social security income. 
So, only a  part of all tax transfers are considered.  So, the model is not able to 
take fully account of the redistributive impact via public funding of the schemes 
under consideration. Therefore, we here show both the redistributive impact of 
the social security benefits and of the social security contributions without and 
with general revenue financing. In the latter case, we assume that the deficits are 
financed by government via the income tax receipts. Further, it has been assumed 
that the  (procentual) contribution from public  funds remains  unchanged  from 
1993  on. 
The various transition rates are based on observations, if available. However, 
especially for the period 1947-1965 additional assumptions had to be made. The 
future demographic transition rates are based on the forecasts of the Netherlands 
Central  Bureau  of  Statistics.  The  transition  probabilities  with  respect  to  the 
education  submodules  are  held  constant  at  the  1988-1evel,  whereas  the  future 
developments in the field of labour participation and unemployment are based 
on forecasts of Department of Social Affairs (1984). It will be assumed here that 
national income grows  annualy by 2°70. Further,  it should be noted,  that  from Lifetime income redistribution by social security 
Table 1. Programme module sequencing for each individual in NEDYMAS 
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A. Demographic module 
1.  Immigration 
3.  Old people's home 
5.  Marriage 
7.  Child custody 
9.  Cohabitation selection 
11.  Splitting-off children 
B. Labour and income module (first part) 
12.  Education 
14.  Income percentile 
16.  Transitions from school 
18.  Transitions from military service 
20.  Transitions from being unemployed 
22.  Retirement 
C. Social security module 
24.  Private pension premiums 
26.  Deduction civil servants 
28.  Widowers state pension benefits 
30.  Family allowances 
32.  Sickness insurance benefits 
34.  Disability pensions civil servants 
36.  Unempl. benefits civil servants 
38.  Unemployment provision benefits 
40.  Provision older and partly disabled 
employees 
43.  Health insurance contributions 
45.  Unemployment insurance contr. 
47.  Widowers state pension contr. 
49.  Family allowances contributions 
51.  Contributions civil servants pension fund 
B. Labour and income module (second part) 
52.  Taxes 
2.  Emigration 
4.  Death 
6.  Divorce 
8.  Dehabitation 1 
10.  Fertility 
13.  Scholarship 
15.  Labour supply 
17.  Transitions from disablement 
19.  Transitions from being employed 
21.  Transitions from the state 
houseman/housewife 
23.  Labour income 
25.  Pension premiums for civil servants 
27.  Old-age state pension benefits 
29.  Widow, widower and orphan pensions for 
civil servants 
31.  Disability state pension benefits 
33.  Disability insurance benefits 
35.  Old-age pensions for civil servants 
37.  Unemployment insurance benefits 
39.  Supplementary benefits 
41.  Social assistance benefits 
42.  Sickness insurance contributions 
44.  Disability insurance contributions 
46.  Old-age state pension contributions 
48.  Disability state pension contributions 
50.  Exceptional medical expenses contributions 
1  In this paper we use the term "cohabitation"  only for people living together without being married. 
If they decide to dissolve their consensual union, we speak of "dehabitation". 
1991 onwards, the social security contributions are determined endogeneously on 
the basis of the simulated benefits and income. A  comparison of simulated data 
with real data can be found in Nelissen (1991,  1993). 
The purpose  of this  study implies that  we  want to  gain more  insight into 
welfare distribution. Thus, the model will have to take into account the consump- 
tion  possibilities  of  households  and  to  consider  welfare  differences  between 
various types of households. To make the welfare positions of different types of 
households comparable, equivalent income must be used. Economists disagree on 
this issue and on which equivalence scale should be used.  Research in the  field 
of lifetime redistribution inclines towards the application of equivalence scales. 
With respect to the choice of the equivalence scales, it holds that other scales (e.g. 
empirical-objective) methods do not result in other conclusions. Of course, the 
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Coulter et al. (1992). We use the results of Diederen (1983), which applies an em- 
pirical-subjective approach. The equivalent scale is applied to each income com- 
ponent and the sum of all the equivalent income components is imputed each year 
to each individual in the household unit. This implies that the income measure 
takes full account of the variance in household circumstances by attributing the 
standard of living of the household to each individual residing in that household. 
For  a  further discussion,  see  Harding  (1993,  pp. 51-55).  Lifetime income (or 
benefit  or  contribution)  is  measured  by  the  sum  of the  (discounted)  annual 
equivalent income (or benefit or contribution) amounts. This can be considered 
as a  type of (discounted) lifetime utility, where the utility function has been de 
fined as  U(Y) =  Y/equivalence scale.  We will speak  of equivalent (lifetime) in- 
come in stead of lifetime utility. In interpreting the results one should be aware 
of this. 
To determine the redistributional effects of the social security system, we look 
at the following: (1) the average lifetime wages and the average benefits from and 
contributions to the social security schemes discerned; (2) the effect of the con- 
tributions and benefits on the Theil coefficient; (3) the net social security benefit 
per  decile and  (4) the  benefit-tax ratio.  These four elements  are given for the 
cohorts born in the years  1930-1935  (cohort 1930),  1936-1945  (cohort 1940), 
1946-1955  (cohort  1950)  and  1956-1965  (cohort  1960).  The income compo- 
nents  have been  adjusted  for the  household  composition  (via the  equivalence 
scale) and the resulting amounts have been adjusted for changes in the wage index 
and discounted to 1990, using a discount rate of 2%, which is about the real in- 
terest rate in the Netherlands during the last century. Therefore, the net benefit 
can  be  considered as  the  real gain  from the  system,  or in  the terminology of 
Burkhauser and Warlick (1981), as the transfer component of the scheme(s) under 
consideration. Moreover, persons who were involved in migration have been ex- 
cluded in our calculations. The calculations are based on ten runs with a different 
set of random numbers,  all starting with a micro database of 10000 persons in 
the year 1947. The simulation runs to the year 2060. Thus, the birth generations 
1930 up to  1960 can be followed almost completely with respect to their socio- 
economic life history. In 2060 only 0.8% of the persons born in the year 1960 is 
still alive and about 5% of those born in 1965. No account has been taken of in- 
come and contributions after 2060.  The average number of persons per run in- 
volved in the simulation amounts to 923 for cohort 1930,  1667 for cohort 1940, 
2297 for cohort 1950 and 2363 for cohort 1960. Because ten runs have been used, 
this implies e.g.  for cohort 1930 that the calculations are based on about 9200 in- 
dividual life histories. The redistributive impact has been measured via compari- 
son  with the gross  wages,  because no data  exist to simulate  a  world in which 
government is absent. Further, it is assumed that the burden of benefits (contribu- 
tions) is fully incident upon the person who receives (pays) the benefit (contribu- 
tion). 
3.  Simulation results 
The simulation results with respect to the lifetime wages, the social security con- 
tributions, the part financed via general revenue and the social security benefits, 
are given in Table 2. Lifetime employers' gross wages (being gross wages including 
employers'  contributions)  are  on  average  Dfl. 2588000  for  the  cohort  1930, Lifetime income redistribution  by social security  95 
Table 2. Lifetime equivalent wages and social security benefits and contributions  (in Dfl. 1000, 1990 
prices) J 
Cohort  1930  Cohort 1940  Cohort 1950  Cohort 1960 
mean  mean  mean  mean 
Wages  incl.  Employers"  2588  3036  3373  3461 
contributions 
Contributions  475  620  768  932 
of which 
General insurances  209  273  344  438 
Employee insurances  116  159  190  215 
Occupational  pensions  150  188  234  279 
Tax financing  196  264  298  345 
of which 
General insurances  60  76  89  123 
Employee insurances  20  45  34  25 
Social assistance  95  121  142  153 
Direct payments  21  22  33  44 
Benefits  1058  1213  1359  1524 
of which 
General insurances  531  546  556  608 
Employee insurances  184  245  249  259 
Social assistance  75  102  116  140 
Direct payments  21  23  35  44 
Occupational  pensions  247  297  403  473 
Net benefits incl.  tax financing  387  329  293  247 
of which 
General insurances  262  197  123  47 
Employee insurances  48  41  25  19 
Social assistance  -  20  -  19  - 26  -  13 
Direct payments  0  1  2  0 
Occupational  pensions  97  109  169  194 
Net benefits excl.  tax financing  583  593  591  592 
of which 
General insurances  322  273  212  170 
Employee insurances  68  86  59  44 
Social assistance  75  102  116  140 
Direct payments  21  23  35  44 
Occupational  pensions  97  109  169  194 
a With the exclusion of health care costs. 
Dfl. 3036000  (cohort  1940),  Dfl. 3373000  (cohort  1950)  and  Dfl. 3461000 
(cohort  1960).  This implies the  following growth  figures:  17.3%  for the  cohort 
1940 in comparison with the cohort 1930,  11.1%  (cohort  1950 versus  1940)  and 
2.6%  (cohort  1960 versus  1950).  Contributions rise from Dfl. 475000  for cohort 
1930 to Dfl. 932000  for the youngest generation, in other words a  rise from  18.4 
to  26.9°70  of  (employers')  gross  wages.  The  contributions  for  the  general 
insurances are more than  doubled between cohort  1930  and  1960,  whereas both 
the  contributions  for  the  employee  insurances  and  occupational  pensions  are 
almost  doubled  between  cohort  1930  and  1960.  The  part  that  is  financed  via 
general  revenue increased  somewhat  less:  from  Dfl. 196000  fi3r  cohort  1930  to 96  Jan H.M. Nelissen 
Dfl. 345000  for  cohort  1960. Half the  amount is  accountable towards  social 
assistance.  The direct payments of the government for (former) public servants 
have also been completely financed from the general revenue. The payments via 
the general revenue for the general insurances is considerably, whereas the percen- 
tual contribution from public funds for the employee insurances is rather limited. 
The benefits have increased less  than the contributions: from Dfl. 1058000  to 
Dfl. 1524000.  The proportion of the general insurances declines from about the 
half of the benefits to about 40%0, whereas the employee insurances remain con- 
stant: somewhat less than 20%. The role of social assistance and the occupational 
pensions, in particular, increases.  The latter form 23 %  of total benefits for the 
cohort 1930, against 31%  for cohort 1960. 
The total net benefit from the social security system, also taking account of 
the contributions via public funding, amounts to Dfl. 387000 for the cohort 1930 
(being  15.0%  of  employers'  gross  wages),  Dfl. 329000  for  1940 (10.8%), 
Dfl. 293000  for 1950 (8.7%) and Dfl. 247000  for 1960 (7.10/0). The gain from the 
social security system is thus declining rapidly, especially in terms of the percen- 
tage of gross wages. This decline can in particular be imputed to the general in- 
surances, whose net benefits decrease by Dfl. 215000  between the oldest and the 
youngest cohort. Especially the old-age state pension results in a large decrease 
in the net benefit in the course of time (see Nelissen 1995). The decrease in the 
net benefit of the employee insurances is smaller: it decreases  by Dfl. 29 000 be- 
tween the oldest and the youngest cohort.  The net return on the general and 
employee insurances will be negative from cohort 1970. This cohort is the first 
one to suffer from the pay-as-you-go system in the social insurance system due 
to the population greying. For social assistance,  the net result is even negative, im- 
plying a negative return on the "investments" in the social assistance system for 
these generations. The net effect of direct payments is close to zero.  In contrast 
with the social insurances, the net effect of the occupational pensions is larger, 
the later the cohort is born. This is partly due to the index-linked nature of these 
pensions in combination with a low discount rate,  and is also partly due to the 
extension of the occupational pension system in the course of time. Grosso modo 
we can say, that the net effect of the social security system becomes smaller,  the 
younger the cohort is;  that the net effect of the general and the employee in- 
surances is very small for the youngest cohort and negative for the cohort 1970; 
and that the occupational pensions result in an increasing net effect. 
If we do not take account of contributions via the taxes, the net benefit hardly 
differs between generations. However, we find analogous trends as in the case we 
take account of these contributions from public funding. General and employee 
insurances show a net benefit, which is smaller, the younger the cohort is, whereas 
occupational pensions and social assistance show the reverse. 
Table 3 reports on the redistributive impact of the Dutch social security system 
as measured by the Theil coefficient. The Theil coefficient for the employers' 
gross wages is 0.161 for cohort 1930, 0.133 for 1940, 0.125 for 1950 and 0.116 for 
1960. So, income inequality within cohorts decreases very fast. The social security 
benefits result in a decrease in the income inequality, whereas the contributions 
have  a  regressive  effect. The Theil coefficient for the lifetime wages  plus  the 
benefits from the general insurances amounts to 0.114 for cohort 1930, 0.099 for 
cohort 1940, 0.097 for cohort 1950 and 0.087 for cohort 1960. So, the benefits 
under the general insurances decrease the Theil coefficient by 23 (cohort 1950) to 
29 (cohort 1930) per cent. Analogous, the benefits under the employee insurances Lifetime income redistribution by social security  97 
Table 3.  Lifetime redistribntive impact of  social  security benefits  and contributions  (Theil coeffi- 
cients,  differences with respect to the Theil coefficient for gross wages (incl.  employers' contribu- 
tions) and adjusted redistributive impact) 
Excluding general revenue financing  Including general revenue financing 
1930  1940  1950  1960  1930  1940  1950  1960 
Theil coefficient 
(1) Employers" gross 
wages 
0.161  0.133  0.125  0.116 
Changes in Theil coefficient (% deviation from (1)) 
Benefits 
General insurances  -  29.5  -  25.5  -  22.6  -  24.8 
Employee insurances  -  10.9  -  10.5  -  9.9  -  9.6 
Social assistance  -  9.6  -  9.4  -  9.0  -  12.3 
Direct payments  -0.7  -  1.0  -  1.0  -  1.4 
Occupational pensions  + 4.2  + 4.0  + 4.9  + 8.3 
Contributions 
General insurances  + 8.3  +  10.4  +  10.8  +  14.6 
Employee insurances  + 3.3  + 3.6  + 3.6  + 4.2 
Social assistance  .... 
Direct payments  .... 
Occupational pensions  + 0.8  +  1.8  +  1.4  + 0.7 
Net benefits 
General ins.  -26.2  -20.6  -  17.5  -  18.0 
Employee ins.  -8.7  -8.2  -7.7  -7.0 
Social assistance  -  9.6  -  9.4  -  9.0  -  12.3 
Direct payments  -0.7  -  1.0  -  1.0  -  1.4 
Occupational pensions  + 4.7  + 5.4  + 6.0  + 9.0 
idem 
+6.4  +8.1  +8.9  +12.0 
+2.5  +3.2  +3.4  +4.0 
-1.1  -2.0  -2.1  -2.1 
-0.2  -0.4  -0.5  -0.6 
+0.8  +1.8  +1.4  +0.7 
-28.5  -22.8  -19.9  -21.3 
-9.4  -8.6  -7.9  -7.3 
-10.5  -11.8  -11.6  -15.0 
-0.8  -1.1  -1.0  -1.4 
+4.7  +5.4  +6.0  +9.0 
Adjusted redistributive impact (%) 
Benefits 
General insurances  -  1.44  -  1.42  -  1.37  -  1.41 
Employee insurances  -  1.54  -  1.30  -  1.34  -  1.28 
Social assistance  -  3.31  -  2.80  -  2.62  -  3,04 
Direct payments  -0.86  -  1.32  -0.96  -  1,10 
Occupational pensions  + 0.44  + 0.41  + 0.41  + 0,61 
Contributions 
General insurances  +  1.10  +  1.16  +  1.06  +  1.15 
Employee insurances  + 0.74  + 0.68  + 0.64  + 0.68 
Social  assistance  .... 
Direct payments  .... 
Occupational pensions  + 0.14  +0.29  + 0.20  +0.09 
Net benefits 
General ins.  -  1.28  -  1.15  -  1.06  -  1.02 
Employee ins.  -  1.23  -  1.02  -  1.04  -  0.94 
Social assistance  -  3.31  -  2.80  -  2.62  -  3.04 
Direct payments  -  0.86  -  1.32  -  0.96  -  1.10 
Occupational pensions  +0.55  +0.55  +0.50  +0.66 
idem 
-1.39  -1.27  -1.21  -1.21 
-1.33  -1.07  -1.07  -0.98 
-3.62  -3.51  -3.17  -3.71 
-0.99  -1.45  -1.06  -1.10 
+0.49  +0.55  +0.50  +0.66 
+0.65  +0.70  +0.69  +0.74 
+0.48  +0.47  +0.51  +0.58 
-0.30  -0.50  -0.50  -0.48 
-0.25  -0o45  -0.47  -0.45 
+0.14  +0~29  +0.20  +0.09 98  Jan H.M. Nelissen 
lead to a  decline of about  10  per  cent for the four cohorts.  Social assistance 
benefits have large income equalizing effect. The Theil coefficient decreases  by 
9 to 12°70. In view of the limited amounts involved (see Table 2), the effect is large. 
Direct payments of the government to their (former) public servants  -  who at 
average  have a  higher income than employees  -  have an only limited income 
equalizing effect. Comparing the earnings-related occupational pensions with the 
old-age  state  pension,  shows  the  difference clearly: the  occupational pension 
benefits increase the income inequality, whereas the old-age state pension con- 
siderably decreases income inequality (see also Nelissen 1994, Sect. 8.2.2). 
The contributions lead to an enlargement of income inequality. The reason for 
this is the existence of a maximum premium income. Looking at the social securi- 
ty contributions without taking account of the financing via general revenue, we 
see that the general insurance ~ontributions increase income inequality by 8% in 
the oldest generation and by 15% in the youngest one, whereas it is only 3 to 4% 
for the employee insurances. This difference can be imputed to the higher con- 
tribution limit in the latter insurance type. The occupational pension contribu- 
tions have an only limited income inequality enlarging effect. Taking into account 
the financing via general revenue,  we find that the income inequality increasing 
effect of the contributions becomes smaller: the taxes have an income equalizing 
effect. The general insurances increase the Theil coefficient now by two percen- 
tage points less. Analogous trends can be found for the employee insurances. The 
occupational pensions  do  not  have  a  financing via general revenue.  So,  here 
nothing changes.  The financing of social  assistance and  the  direct  payments 
results in a  small decrease of the income inequality. 
The net benefits (including the effect of the financing via general revenue) 
show the following picture.  The general insurances reduce the Theil coefficient by 
20 to 29070, whereas employee insurances reduce income inequality by 7 to 9070. 
The net effect of the social assistance is relatively high, whereas the effect for the 
direct payments by the government to its (former) public servants is relatively 
small. At last, we find a large income inequality enlarging effect for the occupa- 
tional pensions. The increase of the income inequality by the occupational pen- 
sions is even larger than the reduction by the employee insurances in the youngest 
cohort. 
So, in practice, we find a larger income equalizing effect for the general in- 
surances in comparison with the employee insurances. However, the effect on the 
Theil coefficient depends on the amounts involved and the size of the general in- 
surance benefits is considerably larger.  To adjust for this, we introduce the  ~d- 
justed redistributive impact', which we define as the quotient of the proportional 
change in  the  Theil  coefficient (with respect  to  the  Theil  coefficient for the 
employers' gross wage) and of the proportion of the scheme involved in the gross 
wages.  So, the adjusted redistributive impact of a scheme shows how much the 
scheme  affects  the  lifetime  income  distribution,  assuming  that  the  scheme 
amounts to one per cent of employers' gross lifetime wages. In this way, the mea- 
sure offers the possibility to compare the redistributive impact of the various 
schemes in a more sophisticated way because it compares the redistributive impact 
under the assumption that the various schemes do not differ with respect to their 
size. These are given in the lower panel of Table 3. The adjusted redistributive im- 
pact for all benefits together amounts to  -1.3%. E.g. for cohort 1930 we have 
a  benefit from the general insurances of Dfl. 531000  and the employers' gross 
wages  amounts to Dfl. 2588000  (see Table2),  whereas the change in the Theil Lifetime income redistribution by social security  99 
coefficient  is  -29.5%0.  So,  the  adjusted  redistributive  impact  equals 
0.295/(531000/2 588 000) =  -  0.295/0.205 =  -  1.44. The negative sign  says  that 
the scheme has an equalizing effect. If the sign is positive, this implies that the 
scheme enlarges income inequality. The figure of -  1.3% means that the 'average' 
benefit diminishes the Theil coefficient by 1.3%, if that 'average' benefit would 
equal  one  per  cent  of the  employers' gross  wages.  In  terms  of the  adjusted 
redistributive impact we find that general insurance benefits have an effect of 
-  1.4%. For the employee insurance benefits we find equalizing effects of the size 
of -  1.3 to -  1.5%. This difference between both is surprisingly small. One would 
expect a  larger (negative) value for the general insurances.  For the general in- 
surance benefits are flat-rated, whereas the employee insurance benefits are wage- 
related schemes. The reason for the almost equal value for both types is  that 
benefits under the employee insurances are higher for those persons who receive 
a benefit on the basis of a high (former) income, but the probability to be eligible 
for such a benefit is for high-income earners smaller in comparison with a benefit 
under the general insurances. This of course depends on the type of insurance. 
It holds in particular for the Unemployment Insurance and the Disablement In- 
surance. The adjusted redistributive impact of the employee insurances has been 
diminished  in  the  course of time,  whereas  it  remains  rather  constant  for the 
general insurances. This trend can be explained by the adaptations in the 1980's, 
when the minimum income guarantee has  been abolished in the employee in- 
surances. Social assistance benefits have a large income equalizing effect as said 
before: its  adjusted redistributive impact is  twice that  of the general and  em- 
ployees insurances. Direct payments of the government to their (former) public 
servants  have  a  smaller  adjusted  redistributive  impact  than  the  general  and 
employee insurances. In terms of the adjusted redistributive impact, the income 
inequality increasing effect of the occupational pension benefits is rather small. 
It varies between 0.41  and 0.61. 
The contributions show the following picture. The adjusted redistributive im- 
pact is now defined as the quotient of the percent change in the Theil coefficient 
(with respect to the Theil coefficient for the employers' gross wages) and the con- 
tributions as a percentage of the employers' gross wages.  It is for the general in- 
surances again larger than that for the employee insurances. But now, its sign is 
positive, which means that income inequality is increased by the contributions. 
The main reason for the difference is that the ceiling for the employee insurances 
is  considerably higher  than  that  for  the  general  insurances  (from  1967 on). 
Between 1967 and 1981, the ceilings  for the employee insurances were about one 
thirds above those for the general insurances; between 1982 and 1989 it was less 
than 10%, but from 1990 onwards the difference is over 60%. The existence of 
a  ceiling results in an increase of income inequality and the lower the ceiling, 
the larger the increase is. The occupational pensions have only a small adjusted 
redistributive impact,  which  is  even  not  significant  for the  youngest genera- 
tion. 
Taking into account the financing via general revenue, the general insurances 
show  a  considerably lower adjusted redistributive impact.  It  now  amounts  to 
about 0.7% against  1.1% without general revenue financing. Analogous trends 
can be found for the employee insurances, but the difference is smaller. The finan- 
cing of the social assistance and the direct payments results in a  small decrease 
of the income inequality. Their redistributive impact (which equals that of the 
taxes) varies between  -0.30 and  -0.50%. 100  Jan H.M. Nelissen 
Looking at the net benefits (including the effect of the financing via general 
revenue) we find that the general insurances result in an adjusted redistributive 
impact which diminishes from -1.39°70  for the oldest cohort to -1.21070 for the 
two  youngest cohorts.  For the  employee insurances  it  is  -1.33  and  -0.98070, 
respectively. So, there is a different impact, but the difference is only small. The 
difference with respect to the redistributive impact is potentially only limited and 
less  than 25070. Generally, it is  assumed that wage-related schemes have a  con- 
siderably  smaller  redistributive  impact  than  fiat-rated  schemes  (see  e.g. Barr 
1992). The net effect of the social assistance is relatively very high. Its adjusted 
redistributive impact amounts to two and a  half (cohort 1930) to three (cohort 
1960) times the impact of the general insurances. On the contrary, the effect for 
the direct payments by the government to its (former) public servants is smaller 
that for the general insurances. At last, we find as can be expected an income in- 
equality enlarging effect for the occupational pensions. 
The third element with respect to the redistributional impact of the social 
security system, is the contribution of the two types of social insurances towards 
income per decile. To that end, the net benefits are also subdivided by the net in- 
tracohort and net intergenerational transfers by decile. This is shown in Fig. 2 for 
the general insurances and in Fig. 3 for the employee insurances. The health costs 
schemes ZFW and AWBZ have not been included, due to lack of data. Because 
the occupational pensions and the social assistance show the expected picture and 
analogous curves for the four cohorts, the figures discerned have not been shown. 
The direct payment have not been included for reason of the very small amounts 
involved. The deciles are determined on the basis of the employers' gross wages 
and the general revenue financing has been included. We see that  -  with the ex- 
ception of the transition from decile I  to decile 2 in the general insurances in 
cohort 1930 and 1950 and in the employee insurances in cohort 1950  -  the net 
benefit decreases, the higher the decile number. The difference between the net 
benefit for the second decile and that for the tenth decile (as a percentage of the 
average net benefit) increases for the general insurances in the course of time from 
57% for cohort 1930 via 71 070 for the intermediate cohorts to 83070 for the cohort 
1960.  The  employee  insurances  show  a  slightly  different  picture.  Here,  the 
aforementioned ratio for the intermediate cohorts is smaller (55070) than for the 
youngest and oldest cohort (71 and 73070, respectively). These figures affirm our 
previous finding that the redistributive impact between both types of insurances 
does not diverge strongly. 
Generally, the net benefit for the general insurances within a decile is lower, the 
younger the cohort is. The only exception is decile 1 in the two youngest cohorts. 
The picture for the employee insurances differs: cohort 1940 shows for each decile 
an equal or a significantly higher net benefit in comparison with the same decile 
in the cohort 1930. The reason for this is, among other things, the extent to which 
persons from the two cohorts made use of the unemployment and disability scheme 
(see Nelissen  1994). The cohorts 1950 and 1960 again show the general picture: the 
net benefit in a  decile is lower the younger the cohort is.  As a  consequence the 
decile number for which the net benefit is negative, is lower, the younger the cohort 
is. The general insurances result in a positive return for all deciles in cohort 1930, 
whereas the return is negative from decile 7 on in cohort 1960. The net benefit for 
the employee insurances is negative for decile 8, 9, and 10 in cohort 1930 and even 
from decile 4 on in the youngest generation, which is of course partly due to the 
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The net benefit for the occupational pensions is always close to zero, with the 
exception of the net benefit for the nineth and tenth decile.  Moreover,  the net 
benefit is larger, the later the cohort has been born. Here, we find -  among other 
things  -  the effect of the back-service,  which is particularly advantageous for 
those with relatively high incomes. It also shows why occupational pensions result 
in an enlargement of income inequality. Social assistance shows a picture for the 
benefits, contributions and net benefits which is analogous to the general insur- 
ances. 
Let us speak of an intracohort contribution if the lifetime benefits for an in- 
dividual are smaller than his/her lifetime contributions. The intracohort transfer 
equals the difference between both. The remaining has been considered as an in- 
trapersonal transfer. The latter also holds for the contribution, if lifetime con- 
tributions are smaller than the lifetime benefits. Assuming that the intracohort 
transfers are  redistributed over  the deciles  as  a  benefit according to the total 
benefits, the net intracohort (or intragenerational) transfers are limited for most 
deciles, with the exception of social assistance,  where they are relatively very high. 
The  net intracohort transfers  are  increasing for the general insurances in the 
course of time, whereas they decrease for the employee insurances. In both cases, 
the lower  deciles  have  a  positive net intracohort transfer,  whereas  the higher 
deciles have a intracohort loss. With respect of the occupational pensions, the net 
intracohort transfers show the same picture like the net benefits. The difference 
between the net benefits and the net intracohort transfers can be seen as an indica- 
tion for the intergenerational transfers. In this, one has to keep in mind that the 
benefits and contributions have been standardized and discounted. 
With  respect  to  the  benefit-contribution ratio  we  note  the  following (see 
Table 4).  Including the  contributions via  taxes,  the  benefit-contribution ratio 
decreases  for the total of all social security schemes involved.  For cohort 1930, 
the benefit-contribution ratio amounts to 1.58, for 1940 1.37, for 1950 1.27 and 
for  1960 1.19. This means that the cohort  1930 gets Dfl. 1.58 for each Dutch 
guilder invested in the social security system, so that the net gain amounts 58% 
whereas this is only 19% for the cohort 1960. Notice that this amount results after 
the application of equivalence scales  and discounting. The lower  benefit-con- 
tribution ratio for cohort 1940 compared to cohort 1930 is particularly due to the 
general  insurances  and  to  a  lesser  extent  to  the  employee insurances.  These 
benefit-contribution ratios decline by 21  and  11%,  respectively.  The youngest 
cohort shows equal benefit-contribution ratios for the general and employee in- 
surances. The benefit-contribution ratio for the occupational pensions is almost 
Table 4. The benefit-contribution ratios (based on equivalent income components) 
Cohort  Excl. tax financing  Incl. tax financing 
1930  1940  1950  1960  1930  1940  1950  1960 
General insurances  2.54 
Employee insurances  1.59 
Occ.  pensions  1.65 
Social assistance 
All schemes  2.23 
2.00  1.62  1.39  1.97  1.56  1.28  1,08 
1.54  1.31  1.20  1.35  1.20  1.11  1,08 
1.58  1.72  1.70  1.65  1.58  1.72  1,70 
-  -  -  0.79  0.84  0.82  0.92 
1.96  1.77  1.64  1.58  1.37  1.27  1.19 104  Jan H.M. Nelissen 
constant, whereas social assistance shows an increasing ratio. So, comparing the 
results for cohort 1960 with those of cohort 1930, shows  us that the decline in 
the total benefit-contribution ratio is due in particular to the developments in the 
general insurances and to a much smaller degree to the developments with respect 
to the employee insurances. The concerning benefit-contribution ratios decreased 
by 45.2 and 20.0o70, respectively, between cohort 1930 and cohort 1960. As a result 
of this, the benefit-contribution ratio of both types of insurances do not show any 
more differences. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this contribution we compared the redistributive impact of five types of social 
security schemes in the Netherlands: (1) general insurances (flat-rated benefits, 
earnings-related contributions); (2) employee insurances (earnings-related bene- 
fits,  earnings-related  contributions);  (3)  social  assistance  (means-tested,  flat- 
related benefits, financed via public funding); (4) occupational pensions (benefits 
related  to  last  earned  income,  earnings-related  contributions)  and  (5)  direct 
payments (earnings-related benefits, financed via public funding). These schemes 
have been studied for the birth generations 1930, 1940, 1950 and 1960. 
It appears that net social security income as a proportion of lifetime wage in- 
come is smaller,  the later the cohort is born. In particular, the net benefit of the 
general insurances declines.  On the contrary, the net benefit from occupational 
pensions increases.  Social assistance results in a small loss for these four genera- 
tions:  its  net  benefit is  negative if we  also  take  into  account  tax  financing. 
Lifetime income inequality is diminished considerably by the general insurances. 
Income inequality, as measured by the Theft coefficient, is reduced by 20 to 29°70. 
Its effect is becoming smaller in the course of time. On the other hand, the income 
equalizing effect of social assistance increases  from 10o70 for cohort 1930 to 15°70 
for cohort 1960. Employee insurances reduce income inequality somewhat less, 
to wit 7 (cohort 1960) to 9070 (cohort 1930). In contrast to these schemes,  occupa- 
tional pensions do increase income inequality and its effect increases  from 5 to 
9o70. 
So, in practice,  we find a larger income equalizing effect for the general in- 
surances in comparison with the employee insurances. However, the effect on the 
Theft coefficient depends on the amounts involved and the size of the general in- 
surance benefits is considerably larger. To adjust for this, we introduced the "ad- 
justed redistributive  impact"  In these terms,  general insurances,  employee in- 
surances  and  direct  payments have  about  the  same impact.  Social  assistance 
schemes result in a very large income redistribution. As said, occupational pen- 
sions increase income inequality, but its increasing impact is smaller than the in- 
equality reducing impact of the social insurances. 
The comparison of general and employee insurances shows that on a lifetime 
basis the redistributive impact of flat-rated insurances does not necessarily largely 
differ from earnings-related insurances. It is generally assumed that flat-rated in- 
surances, like the general insurances in the Netherlands, are more redistributive 
than wage-related insurances, like the employee insurances. This has also been 
confirmed by period analyses (see e.g. Muffels et al. (1986) for the Netherlands). 
But the Dutch practise shows that on a lifetime basis the income equalizing effect 
of the flat-rated benefit in comparison with a wage-related benefit (in combina- Lifetime income redistribution by social security  105 
tion with a maximum level of the benefit) can be neutralized  by a lower contribu- 
tion ceiling for the former type of insurance. 
This implies that a change-over from a system based on general insurances  to 
a  system  based  on  employee  insurances  does  not  necessarily  result  in  a  less 
redistributive  system.  It heavily depends on the eligibility conditions and the level 
of the ceiling. This also holds in case of privatization of social security schemes. 
Introducing or extension of means-tested elements in general  insurances,  as is in 
discussion for the old-age state  pension,  will increase the income redistributive 
impact  of the social security  system.  On the other hand,  the extension of oc- 
cupational pensions at cost of the old-age state pension, which is the consequence 
of the current government policy in the Netherlands via only partly indexation of 
state  pensions, will diminish lifetime income inequality. 
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